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  Do natural disasters open a window of opportunity for corruption? 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
 
This study explores the link between natural disasters and corruption at the local government. 
We examine whether a natural disaster affects official households more favorably than non-
official households. We find that natural disasters decrease nonofficial household 
expenditures significantly, however have negligible effect on official household expenditures. 
Meanwhile, both kinds of households experience similar reduction in incomes, and have 
much the same disaster coping strategies. Together, the results imply that local officials may 
receive unobserved monetary compensation – we define as corruption - in the aftermath of 
natural disasters. 
 
JEL: Q3, H3, C2 
 
Keywords: Corruption, local government officials, natural experiment, windfalls resources. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Around 400 B.C, Kautilya in his ancient Indian political treatise Arthasastra
i
 offered a key 
following insight:  
 
        "It is just as difficult to detect an official's dishonesty as it is to discover 
how much water is drunk by the swimming fish." 
 
This insight is inline with Olken (2007) Banerjee et al., (2012) ‘s point that corruption studies 
face the challenge of finding an adequate comparison group and - an exogenous source of 
variation, which induces changes in incentives to engage in corrupt behavior. To address this 
challenge, our study jointly explores two emerging research areas: corruption and natural 
disasters. Our study focuses on local governments in Vietnamese communes. A novel aspect 
of this study is that it considers natural disasters an exogenous shock to the economic 
environment, which provides an incentive for corruption.
ii
 
  A natural disaster arguably influences corruption via three channels. First, in disaster 
time, consumption is low, the marginal utility of consumption is high, and thus the value of 
siphoning off public money is high. This logic is consistent with the finding in our study that 
local officials approximately smooth their expenditures. Second, government transparency 
may be worsened in the affected communes due to the collapse of infrastructure and the 
disorder that results from natural disasters. Officials may find it easier to engage in corrupt 
behavior under such circumstances. Finally, the occurrence of a natural disaster is usually 
accompanied with relief aid from the central government and/or other donating organizations. 
Given that officials are primarily responsible for handling relief funds, it is plausible for them 
to abuse such windfall resources for personal use. 
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 Methodologically, given the lack of variables that measure corruption directly, 
following Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007) and Gorodnichenko et al., (2009) we apply the 
“forensic economics” approach to address the link between natural disasters and corruption.iii  
Though there is a large literature on indirect approaches to quantify corruption, most existing 
works focused on "steady state" levels of corruption. We provide a novel insight into the 
corruption problem by exploring the "state-dependent" nature of corruption.
iv  Specifically, 
we focus on the flow of disaster relief – which represents a one-shot disbursement of funds. 
This approach differs from a standard approach – which uses stream of government spending 
that is subject to embezzlement.
v
  
To identify the existence of corruption in affected communes, we examine whether 
the disaster has the same effect on income differential between official and non-official 
households as it does on the expenditure differentials. We conjecture that a similar effect on 
income of official and nonofficial households should lead to insignificant differences in the 
expenditure patterns. Yet, we find that disasters affect the expenditure of official households 
more favorably, while reduce their incomes just as much as nonofficial households.  We 
attribute this discrepancy to corruption by officials in the affected communes. 
An important aspect of natural disaster study is that households may have different 
coping strategies (Cavallo and Noy, 2011; Thomas et al., 2010). We are interested in whether 
official households have better coping mechanisms that help them achieve higher 
expenditures in the aftermath of natural disasters.  The diversity of mechanisms makes it 
difficult to examine them all.   Having a very comprehensive data set, however enables us to 
consider a broad range of coping mechanisms.
vi
 In particular, we examine whether 
remittances, savings, asset holdings, migrating behavior, and access to formal credit 
institutions are significantly different between official and nonofficial households, and 
between affected and unaffected communes.  
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We find that the differences in coping strategies are insignificant or only marginally 
significant. Both official and nonofficial households are affected equally by natural disasters, 
and both have the same coping mechanisms. Thus, one would expect their expenditures to 
also be affected equally by disasters. However, disasters seem to favorably influence local 
officials in affected communes. This result confirms the proposition that officials might 
receive unobserved monetary compensation in the aftermath of a natural disaster. We refer to 
this unobserved, non-reported compensation as corruption. 
One may wonder why Vietnam is an ideal setting to study the link between corruption 
and natural disasters. According to a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) survey, Vietnam 
ranked 112
th
 out of 183 countries. Corruption has almost become a matter that is taken for 
granted in daily life. Vietnam’s central government has realized one of the main causes for 
the widespread nature of corruption; low salaries of government officials.  Another reason for 
conducting this study in Vietnam is that the country is prone to a number of natural disasters 
due to its geographical location. Moreover, the disasters occur on a large scale. The 
nationally represented data (VNLSS) used in this study contains almost 50% of the 
households impacted by the disasters.  Hence, a nice balance – in terms of sample size - 
between the treated (affected communes) and comparison (unaffected communes) can be 
established. Finally, while we study corruption using Vietnamese data, this phenomenon has 
to be quite general (almost any relief effort is accompanied by embezzlement scandals), and 
many readers will find the results in the paper broadly interesting.  
We proceed with the remainder of the paper as follows.  The next section summarizes 
related literature on corruption. Section 3 outlines the local context of corruption in Vietnam 
and argues that natural disasters and government relief aid could serve as a "natural 
experiment," which allows for evidence of the corruption associated with relief aid to be 
identified. Section 4 develops a simple model on corruption, building upon the agency 
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approach as in Becker and Stigler (1974).  Section 5 describes the data set and empirical 
strategies, and section 6 presents the empirical results. We then conclude the paper and offer 
suggestions for the direction for future research. 
  
2 Related Literature 
 
In an excellent survey, Banerjee et al., (2012),  and Cole and Tran (2010) indicate that 
researchers have not arrived at an acceptable measure of corruption because of its variety and 
secretive nature. It is likely because of this that only a handful of empirical studies on 
corruption exist. These few studies have developed rather innovative methodologies to tackle 
the challenge of studying corruption.  In what follows, we focus on the most relevant studies. 
An interesting strand of literature relates to the windfall resource hypothesis.
vii
 
According to this hypothesis, officials may have a tendency to abuse public goods, such as 
disaster related relief funds. Brollo et al., (2012) in a study in Brazil find that an increased 
federal transfer results in greater political corruption. Applying the regression discontinuity 
design (RDD) approach, Querbin and Snyder (2011) suggest that rent extraction and 
corruption are more likely to occur during periods of political turmoil.  Leeson and Sobel 
(2008) find a close correlation between corruption and natural disasters in the US: each 
additional $100 per capita in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) relief aid 
increases the average state’s corruption level by nearly 102 percent.viii  In a study on Peru, 
Maldonado (2010) estimates that the predicted probability of being asked to pay a bribe by a 
local public official, is reduced by 1.5-1.8 percentage points in districts experiencing a 
change in the prices of resources. 
 
A “forensic economic” approach 
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Given the challenge of measuring corruption, a novel approach to study corruption is  
“forensic economic”.  The key insight of this approach is that two measures of the same 
economic activity should yield similar results, at least in the absence of activity that is hidden 
from one of the measures.  As such, using forensic economic approach enables us to identify 
patterns of statistical anomalies that may suggest corrupting behavior (Zitzewitz, 2011; 
Sequeira, 2012). Researchers have implemented this approach in various contexts including 
public and private sector workers (Gorodnichenko and Peter, 2007), the politics of firms 
(Fisman, 2001; Fisman et al., 2006), schooling (Jacob and Levitt, 2003), Summo wrestling 
(Duggan and Levitt, 2002), and the household poverty index (Camacho and Conover, 2009). 
Each study uses different approach to measure corruption. For instance, Olken and Barron 
(2009) use bribe payments to police officers, soldiers, and weigh station attendants to 
measure corruption.  Reinikka and Svensson (2005) define the gap between data on Ugandan 
central government’s  school appropriations and  money that actually reached the schools – 
as a measure of corruption.   Gorodnichenko and Peter’s (2007) study is most closely related 
to ours. They explore whether a difference in income between the public and the private 
sector would lead to similar differences in consumption patterns of public and private 
employees. The difference between these two patterns points to the existence of corruption.  
 
In sum, most of the existing work focused on "steady state" levels of corruption.  We 
provide a novel insight into the corruption problem by studying the "state-dependent" nature 
of corruption. We also improve upon the aforementioned studies’ identification strategy by 
focusing on the exogenous aspect of natural disasters. 
 
3 Local corruption and natural disasters in Vietnam 
 
In this section, we will briefly describe the political and social context within which local 
governance is situated. We then discuss features of natural disasters in Vietnam, and their 
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link with corruption studies. 
 
3.1 Local Governance in the communes of Vietnam
ix
  
 
At the commune level, the People's Committee is the administrative unit elected by the 
People's Council to implement the policies proposed by the Council.  In reality, the real 
power lies in the hands of the leaders of the Communist Party Organ of the commune, who 
often hold key positions in the Council, the Committee, and the Commune's Police Station 
(Malesky et al., 2013). There is very little separation between these bodies, and the operation 
of the Party Organ is usually kept out of the public scrutiny. As such, there are very few 
credible mechanisms to detect the embezzlement of public funds (Nguyen, 2009).
x
 
Meanwhile, the use of an "efficiency wage" as the way to prevent corruption (Becker and 
Stigler 1974) has mostly not been in practice in Vietnam. In sum, the institutional 
arrangements and the tight public budget create fertile ground for corruption at the local 
level. In the next section, we will discuss how a natural disaster formulates an ideal setting to 
study corruption. 
 
3.2. Natural Disasters generate an ideal setting to address corruption   
 
Vietnam is endowed with abundant rainfall, a dense network of rivers, and an extensive 
irrigation system, which enables it to produce a wide range of crops, including rice and other 
cash crops. Vietnam is one of the major exporters of rice, coffee, tea and cashews. At the 
same time, Vietnam also has to cope with various natural disasters including floods, 
droughts, and typhoons, which can cause severe damage to its agriculture and aquaculture. 
Figure 1.1 presents the loss by natural disasters as a percentage of GDP over the years.  We 
can observer a great deal of variance over the years reflecting the uncertain nature of natural 
disasters.  
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A relevant question to this study is whether the assignment of affected and unaffected 
communes is truly random.  One may argue, for instance, that communes located near the 
rivers may experience more floods; likewise hurricanes may happen more frequently in the 
costal areas. Yet, as can be observed in figure 1.2, each type of natural disaster tends to focus 
on a different location: floods occur in the delta region, hurricanes in the coastal region, 
drought in the highland region, and flash floods in the mountainous areas. Each commune in 
a given region has the same likelihood of experiencing the corresponding natural disaster. It 
is also worth noting the link between different types of natural disasters. For example, 
according to the Ministry of Agriculture’s Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control, 
typhoons can affect around 80–90 percent of the population, including not only communes 
living along the long coastline, but also those living in the upland areas that are vulnerable to 
subsequent flashfloods resulting from the typhoons’ heavy rains. xi Put differently, natural 
disasters spread out across the whole country in such a way that a large number of communes 
have an equal chance of being impacted. In addition, Vietnam is next to one of the five routes 
of typhoons in the world, therefore the pattern of hydrometeorology is hardly anticipated 
(CCFSC, 2010).  
To investigate whether there exists any significant difference between the communes, 
Table 1 presents primary statistics on demographic, geographical, and infrastructure 
characteristics of communes  - according to whether or not they were affected by the disaster.  
In addition, the households’ statistics on main demographic variables are presented in Table 
2. We classify the household according to whether they are official households and whether 
they were affected by natural disaster. Overall, households share most of demographic 
characteristics including age, gender, and education. Our two main variables of interest are 
income and expenditures. Official households have higher incomes than nonofficial ones, 
though the difference is insignificant. This pattern is observed in both affected and unaffected 
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households. Also, affected households have lower incomes, thereby suggesting the negative 
impact of disasters on those households. As for expenditures, nonofficial households in the 
affected communes have a significantly lower level than their counterparts in unaffected 
communes. Put differently, the expenditure differentials due to the disaster’s effects are 
consistent with income differentials among nonofficial households. Interestingly, we do not 
observe this same consistence among official households; there is no significant expenditure 
differential between affected and unaffected communes.  
The result indicates that the affected and the unaffected communes share numerous 
characteristics.   Still, we are cautious about the potential selection bias. For example, there 
could be unobserved characteristics of the affected communes that make it easier for 
corruption to take place. Likewise, there may be unobserved characteristics of populations in 
affected communes that cause them to settle there. As such, the empirical strategy is mostly 
focused on the combination of panel data and the exogenous aspect of the disaster. The fixed 
effect approach, which addresses time invariant elements of the communes and households, 
helps partially solve unobserved commune and household characteristics. In a sense, this 
study may be considered the second best alternative to an ideal natural experiment study 
xii
.    
 
4. A Theoretical Framework 
  
To guide the empirical study, we build upon the Becker and Stigler (1974) seminal paper to 
develop a simple model, so as to identify the determining factors of corruption. We rely on 
Becker’s and Stigler’s formulation because it is simple yet insightful, and has been supported 
by a number of empirical studies e.g., Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003). We show that the 
greater the loss the disaster causes to the commune, the more local transparency is affected, 
and thus the higher the incentive for officials to become corrupt. Also, the income differential 
between officials and non-officials can explain the increase in corruption. A key insight is 
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that officials might not have the same level of incentive to corrupt if their wages are 
sufficiently higher than workers in other occupations. Thus, a small wage gap may be a 
causal factor of corruption.  We sum up the key insights in the two following lemmas:  
 
Lemma 1: The higher the loss caused by a natural disaster to the communes, the more the 
local official corrupts.  
Lemma 2: The smaller the gap in wages between local officials and non-officials, the higher 
the incentive for corruption. 
 
We relegate the detailed derivations of the model to Appendix 1. 
 
Lemmas 1 and 2 highlight two of the primary reasons for the prevalence of corruption: the 
natural disaster, and the wage gap between official and nonofficial workers. The empirical 
section demonstrates that the former is more likely to affect the expenditure differential, and 
thus indirectly affect corruption.   
 
5 Dataset 
 
Our dataset is drawn from the 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008 panel of the Vietnam Living 
Standard Survey (VLSS). The Vietnam's General Statistical Office - with technical assistance 
from the World Bank, and funding from the United Nations Development Program and the 
Swedish International Development Agency – conduct this survey biannually. The sample of 
the VLSS was a self-weighted sample drawn from Vietnam nationwide. The sample was 
stratified so that 20% of the households were from urban areas, thus corresponding to the 
rural/urban population ratio of Vietnam at that time. Within each of the two strata, the list of 
all communes (around 10,000 in total) was drawn up province by province. The communes 
were then selected in such a way that they were spread out evenly among all provinces in 
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Vietnam. Each month, the VLSS covered one tenth of the sample; the total fieldwork took 
about 12 months. The VLSS was implemented at the highest standards set out by the World 
Bank. Intensive supervision was implemented to ensure the reliability of the data: one 
supervisor for every two interviewers, one anthropometrist, and one data entry operator. 
The VLSS covers two types of data: a household questionnaire and a community 
questionnaire. The former provides information about the characteristics of the households 
including income, expenditures and consumption; educational level of the household's 
members; health, fertility and nutrition; employment and earnings; migration activities; 
housing and durable assets; agricultural activities; non-agricultural self-employment; credit 
and savings; and general community characteristics. The latter includes detailed information 
about the commune. The questionnaire for communes is competed by local government 
officials, village chiefs, teachers (for the Education section), and public health workers (for 
the Health section). 
  We focus the analysis on rural households, which accounts for almost 80% of the 
observations. This is because rural households are distinctly more affected by disasters than  
those in urban, primarily due to their dependence on agricultural production.
xiii
 Also, formal 
institutions are more developed in urban areas, which help households cope with disasters 
much better than rural households. For obvious reasons, we also drop households whose 
answers were deemed unreliable by the interview team. In the analysis, we have 2984 
communes and 27,050 households. An explanation of the variables can be found in the 
Appendix A2. 
 
6. Empirical strategy and major findings 
 
In a nutshell, this study indirectly explores the effect of a natural disaster on corruption. We 
first rely on the exogenous feature of the disaster to identify its effect on a household’s 
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income and expenditures.
xiv
  We then examine whether the effect of natural disaster on 
income and expenditures share the same pattern. If the disaster affects the official households 
more favorably, it may point to evidence of corruption behavior among officials in the 
affected communes.  
The key variable in this study is the occurrence of a natural disaster. The VNLSS 
surveys ask the following question in the commune’s questionnaire: “In the last three years, 
has your commune experienced any natural disaster?”.  The interviewees were then asked to 
fill in the corresponding year in which the disaster occurred.  We generate a binary variable 
to indicate whether the commune was hit by natural disasters - including droughts, 
earthquakes, epidemics, floods, extreme temperatures, insect infestations, avalanches, 
landslides, storms, volcanoes, fires, and hurricanes. The lag of the disaster variable is also 
used since it may arguably affect expenditure, income, and coping strategies. Another 
variable of interest is local officials.  We define local officials as those working for one of the 
following local government organizations of the communes: the communist party organ, the 
committee council, and the police station.  
 
Consumption income gap approach based specification 
We first provide an overall pattern of the correlation between household’s expenditure 
and consumption. As Gorodnichenko et al., (2009) we build the empirical strategy upon the 
consumption-income gap approach. The key idea is related to the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis conjecturing that consumption signals important information about income.  
Consistent gap between consumption and income may suggest unreported income, and point 
to the existence of corruption.  Following this insight, we consider the specification: 
 
ln
E
ivt
Y
ivt
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ = b0 + b1 *official + b * X itv +d v +t tg +Cvt + e itv                                     (1)
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where the index i, j, t  represent individual i, commune v , and time t resepectively
 
 
E
itv
,  Y
itv
 reperesent the household's per capita expenditure and income 
official  is the binary variable indicating whether  the household has 
at least one member to work for local goverment  
 
X
ivt
 is a vector of the household's  demographic characteristics
C
vt
 is a vector of time-commune covariates 
d
v
,t
t
 are  commune, and year fixed effect respectively
e
itv
 is the standard error term.
 
We run the above model for natural disaster affected and unaffected communes separately. 
Table 3 presents the main determinants of the household’s expenditure-income gap. Most 
noticeably is the significant and positive effect of the “official” variable in the regression for 
affected communes. This result implies that the expenditure-income gap for official 
households in those communes is significantly greater than other households in the same 
communes.  Put differently, controlling for income level - official households in affected 
commune are likely to spend more than nonofficial counterparts.  In the following sections, 
we will show that this result may point to the evidence of corruption among local officials.     
 
6.1. The effect of natural disasters on household income 
We next address the relationship between a natural disaster and household income. To 
address the effect of the disaster on income, we consider the following model specification:
xv
  
 
 
 
where Yivt  is the household’s per capita income, Dvt  is a binary variable representing whether 
the household was in the affected area, Ivt  is a binary variable indicating whether the natural 
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disaster caused more than 10% reduction in the crop output, wgapvt  represents the wage gap 
between officials and non-officials in commune v, cvt  is a vector of commune-time 
covariates, d v  and t t  represents the commune and time fixed effect, Xivt  is a vector of 
household’s demographic characteristics. 
 
Main Findings 
Table 4 presents the result from the OLS model using the above specification. As 
expected, the natural disaster and its scale have a negative effect on the per capita income of 
households. Also, a natural disaster on a lager scale has a greater impact.  Interestingly, we 
find that the interaction between the natural disaster and official b3  does not have a 
significant effect on income. This finding implies that official households’ incomes decrease 
as much as non-official households in affected communes.  
  
6.2. Natural disasters, expenditures, and corruption analysis 
We continue the analysis by examining the link between natural disasters and household 
expenditure. The last section’s finding implies that the disaster affects official households as 
much as nonofficial ones. We are interested in whether that same effect still exists for the 
household expenditure.  To address the link between disaster and household expenditure, we 
apply the same empirical specification (2) in which the dependent variable Eivt  is the 
household’s per capita expenditure.  
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To explore evidence for corruption, we proceed with the following strategy. The previous 
section has shown that the natural disaster reduces the income of official households as much 
as nonofficial households.
xvi
 We expect to observe the same story with the household’s 
expenditure. If the expenditures of official households are less affected by the disaster, it 
evidences corruption by officials in the affected communes. Specifically, they may abuse 
relief aid and other related funds to compensate for loss in income. To incorporate Lemma 1 
from the theoretical section, we consider the effect of the disaster scale and its interactions 
with official. Regarding Lemma 2, we are interested in whether communes whose officials 
have lower wages than other workers are more likely to experience corruption. In particular, 
we can look at the two following aspects:  first, the interactive effect of the official and the 
wage gap variables, and second,  the triple interactive effect of official, wage gap, and natural 
disaster variables – also known as the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) 
estimation. Lemmas 1 and 2 in the theoretical model show that corruption may be increased 
due to 2 factors: a natural disaster, and a wage gap between official and nonofficial workers. 
Integrating this insight into model specification (3), we arrive at two corresponding scenarios: 
 
1. Both l8  and l9  are significantly greater than zero. This implies that officials are more 
likely to corrupt in communes with a negative wage gap ( ). Also, the wage gap 
has a higher effect in affected communes ( ). 
2. Only  l9 is significantly greater than zero. As such, corruption – due to the wage gap 
– is likely to occur only in the affected communes. This scenario is consistent with 
lemma 1, which states that a more severe disaster leads to a higher level of corruption. 
It is also possible that officials in the affected communes have more windfall 
resources available, such as relief funds, to corrupt. Moreover, worsened transparency 
resulting from a natural disaster can increase the incentive for corruption.   
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Main findings: 
The result from Table 5 shows that a natural disaster has a negative effect on the household’s 
expenditure, as with income; though the effect is significant at only 10% level.  Overall, 
official households enjoy higher expenditures than nonofficial ones.  The most interesting 
finding is the significant effect of the interaction term between the disaster scale and the 
official l5  suggesting that natural disasters significantly favor the official households’ per 
capita expenditures. Likewise, the interaction between the disaster scale and the official l7  is 
significant. This finding supports Lemma 1 because it suggests that a positive correlation 
between the disaster severity and corruption level.  
Regarding the effect of the wage gap between officials and non-officials, we do not 
observe a significant interaction effect of official and the wage gap 
 
l
8  
on expenditure. Yet, 
the triple interaction of official, the wage gap, and natural disasters 
 
l
9
 does have a significant 
effect. This finding is consistent with scenario 2 mentioned above, and implies that the wage 
gap has a stronger effect on corruption in affected communes than unaffected communes. 
Furthermore, it points to the conjecture that natural disasters seem to be the primary driver of 
corruption, rather than the wage gap.  
To see a clearer pattern of the differential effect that natural disasters have on official 
and nonofficial households, we run the regression for them separately.  Table 5, columns 3 
and 4 present the results for official and nonofficial households respectively. The key finding 
is that nonofficial households in the affected communes have significantly lower per capita 
expenditures than their counterparts in unaffected communes; the effect is even stronger in 
more severely affected communes. However, the pattern is very different for official 
households.  Specifically, a natural disaster shows a significant effect at the 10% level, and 
its scale shows an insignificant effect on expenditure.  The t statistics test indicates higher 
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coefficients of natural disaster and its scales for official households, thereby suggesting that 
natural disasters affect official households more favorably than nonofficial households. This 
poses the question: which factor derives this sharp differential?  
 We conjecture that the source of the above difference can be largely explained by the 
corruption by local officials in the affected communes.  A natural disaster may increase the 
incentive to corrupt through two channels. First, natural disasters are usually accompanied by 
relief funds, or windfall resources. Therefore officials in affected communes may abuse their 
power and access the funds for personal use.  Conversely, nonofficial and official workers in 
the unaffected areas do not have access to such funds. Secondly, disasters may disturb local 
governance making it more difficult to maintain transparency and accountability. This in turn 
makes it easier for officials to corrupt.  
 
7. Coping mechanisms 
The above analysis indicates an interesting link between natural disasters, household income, 
and household expenditures.  We find indirect evidence of corruption by officials in affected 
communes. However, there remains an important aspect: it is quite plausible that official 
households in affected communes have better coping mechanisms than other households. For 
example, official households may have better access to formal financial institutions making it 
easier for them to smooth consumption in the wake of the disaster. If so, it is possible they 
will yield a better outcome than nonofficial households in the aftermath of natural disasters, 
even without corruption.  While there are a number of coping mechanisms, we will focus on 
the most important ones: remittances and migration. We relegate other mechanisms in the 
Appendix. 
xvii
 
 
7.1. Remittances: 
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Both domestic and international remittances play a key role in stabilizing the household’s 
consumption in the event of an unexpected shock, such as a natural disaster (Noy, 2007).  It 
is worth asking whether official households receive more remittances than non-official 
households. If so, it’s not corruption but rather corruption may explain higher expenditure 
among official households in the aftermath of a disaster.  We present the main finding in 
column 1 of Table 6.   All key interaction terms between officials and natural disasters are 
not significant. This finding implies indifference in the likelihood of receiving remittances 
between official and nonofficial households in the affected areas.  
 
7.2. Migration 
Migration plays an important role in coping with disaster.  Households may choose to move 
to other communes in response to a natural disaster. Those choosing to remain in affected 
communes may possess unobservable characteristics.  Put differently, there could be 
selection bias among households stationing in the affected communes. 
xviii
 This bias could 
influence income and expenditure behaviors. In what follows, we will show that households 
in affected share much the same migration patterns as those in unaffected communes. 
Our analysis is based on the VNLSS question asking how long the participants have 
been living in their current communes. We define migrant households to be those whose 
heads’ age are greater than the number of years the household has been living in the 
commune
xix
.  We are interested in whether there are more migrant households in the 
unaffected communes. Another interesting question relates to the differences in migration 
behavior between official and nonofficial households.  
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable – i.e., whether or not the household is a 
migrant household – we apply the same model specification as in section 7.4. Column 2 of 
Table 7 presents the relationship between migration and other variables.  We do not observe 
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any significant difference between households in affected and unaffected communes. 
Interestingly, there are more migrant households in communes in which the wage gap 
between officials and non-officials is higher. 
 
Conclusions: 
This study explores the link between natural disasters and corruption. We find a natural 
disaster reduces household incomes for both official and unofficial households.  Further, 
more severe disasters correlate with a greater decrease in household incomes. At the same 
time, natural disasters have almost no effect on expenditures per capita for official 
households in the affected communes, while they do have a significant effect on nonofficial 
households in the same communes. We conjecture that in response to the impact of natural 
disasters, officials may abuse their power for private gain. Furthermore, more severe disasters 
induce higher incentive for officials to corrupt.  
 Our paper can be improved upon in a number of aspects. First, though disasters may 
be exogenous at the commune level, they may not be so at the household level. For example, 
Buttenheim (2006) and Mueller & Quisumbing (2011) find that poor households in 
Bangladesh are more sensitive to flood shock.  While we have elaborated on this point at 
some degree in the section on coping mechanisms, it is important to fully explore whether 
poor households are more sensitive to natural disasters.
xx
 Secondly, an important channel 
through which a natural disaster increases corruption is via its effect on government 
transparency. As highlighted, the disaster may arguably affect local governance, making it 
more difficult to monitor the distribution of relief aid.   Due to a lack of data, we have not 
explored this channel thoroughly enough. The link between natural disasters and governance 
points to a need for a more active role from the central government in monitoring local 
officials and relief aid in affected communes. The more severe the disaster, the higher the 
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incentive for corruption, and thus the greater the effort required by the central government to 
maintain transparency and accountability. Further research in this dimension could be 
promising in terms of providing more insight into corruption literature. 
 To some extent, we follow a “forensic economic” approach to identify evidence of 
corruption. An assumption here is that official and nonofficial households share the same 
coping mechanisms.  Thanks to the rich and comprehensive data set, we are able to explore 
and demonstrate robust findings on various coping mechanisms that households may use. 
However, other unobserved coping mechanisms might exist. Likewise, dynamic effect of 
corruption on income and consumption is interesting yet unexplored in the literature. For 
instance, the household’s ability to smooth consumption may rely on assets purchased using past 
corruption. These are potential directions for future research to explore.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics of communes    
     
  Affected communes Unaffected communes 
  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Land area 38 12 35 15 
Population 10149 6340 10187 7261 
Average household size 4.40 1.01 4.68 1.30 
Gini coefficient 0.32 0.12 0.31 0.10 
Percentage of underdeveloped communes
*
 10 2.3 13 3.20 
Commune's Proportion of farmers  0.81 0.32 0.85 0.23 
Proportion in coastal region 8.39  7.02  
Proportion in delta region 60.33  51.40  
Proportion in highland region 8.36  5.30  
Proportion in mountain region 9.12  19.22  
Proportion in high mountain region 13.81  17.06  
Distance to district center (km) 4.80 1.23 4.50 1.15 
     
Number of communes 1302   1682   
 
 
* Note: The underdeveloped communes are categorized by the central government, which 
implements various programs to help improve the socioeconomic conditions of the 
communes. 
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Table 2: Household's main characteristics     
       
               Mean    
                  Std. 
Dev 
  
  N.official   Official Total 
N.offici
al  
Official Total 
Total       
Age 32.81 31.53 32.7 21.22 18.73 21.04 
Gender 1.48 1.49 1.48 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Schooling years 6.39 9.64 6.65 3.61 3.06 3.68 
Total hh consumption expenditure 
(1000VND) 
33730 38898 35829 9580 5758 9319 
Total hh main income (1000VND)) 38234 38358 38391 5262 5945 5683 
Remittance (1000VND) 39.86 47.68 42.14 16.86 21.14 18.72 
Savings (1000VND) 1558 1778 1588 358 788 577 
Access to banking  (%) 25.23 28.18 26.15    
Migration (%) 5.25 3.28 4.58    
N 25770 1280 27050    
Unaffected             
Age 33.43 32.08 33.31 21.38 19.19 21.21 
Gender 1.49 1.48 1.49 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Schooling years 6.83 9.7 7.07 3.54 3 3.58 
Total hh consumption expenditure 
(1000VND) 
36694 38315 37905 3358 2842 3974 
Total hh main income (1000VND) 41274 42584 42551 3970 3889 3932 
Remittance (1000VND) 54.52 47.65 48.58 23.62 29.61 25.39 
Savings (1000VND) 2378 2357 2358 323 567 458 
Access to banking  (%) 24.35 28.38 25.58    
Migration (%) 5.38 2.35 4.35    
N 14181 716 14897    
Affected             
Age 32.02 30.78 31.93 21.03 18.04 20.81 
Gender 1.47 1.49 1.47 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Schooling years 5.79 9.56 6.08 3.63 3.14 3.73 
Total hh consumption expenditure 
(1000VND) 
30255 31236 33165 3537 3346 3645 
Total hh main income (1000VND) 35649 35877 35810 4464 5123 3256 
Remittance (1000VND) 37.74 38.96 38.32 21.49 25.75 23.31 
Savings (1000VND) 1335 1355 1338 458 857 758 
Access to banking  (%) 25.58 28.25 27.18    
Migration (%) 5.12 1.25 3.28    
N 11589 564 12153    
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Table 3: Being an official has significant effect on  household's expenditure and income gap 
in affected communes 
 
 
 
 Affected communes Unaffected communes 
Number of HH members -0.021  -0.015  
 (0.012)  (0.112)  
Age -0.026  -0.032 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.015)  
Gender -0.012  -0.023  
 (0.112)  (0.018)  
Log of schooling years 0.014  0.017  
 (0.015)  (0.012)  
Official 0.025 ** 0.005  
 (0.011)  (0.016)  
 Coastal region -0.012  -0.015  
 (0.133)  (0.021)  
Delta rivers regions -0.011  -0.016 ** 
 (0.023)  (0.008)  
Highland region -0.021 * -0.014  
 (0.011)  (0.025)  
Control for other demographic 
variables  
Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes  
Commune fixed effect Yes  Yes  
Number of households 12153  14897  
Adjusted R squared 0.05  0.06  
 
Robust standard errors clustered at communes in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1.2: Map of natural disaster in Vietnam 
 
 
                                                        
i The quotation is found in the book “Arthaśāstra, The Science of Wealth” by Thomas R 
Trautmann.  
ii Baker and Bloom (2015) show that the occurrence of a natural disaster may be 
endogenously given in the long run, for example deforestation may cause changes in the 
frequency of natural disasters. However, in the short run disasters are mostly 
exogenous.  This relates to the discussion on global warming and rainfall – a widely 
used instrumental variable in many studies.   
iii As discussed in the literature review, most studies on corruption use information on 
the “corruption perception” as a proxy. Few other studies look at bribery amounts 
reported by individuals or firms; both have shortcomings. For instance, bribery 
reporting may be subject to errors given the illegality of corruption, both from the 
perspective of officials who receive the bribes, and from the individuals or firms who 
offer the bribes. 
iv We thank a referee for this insight. 
v Hence, the incentive effects of a one time windfall on officials may be very different from 
those related to steady state spending. 
vi The panel household living standard surveys used in this study contain very detailed 
information about the status of households, including income, expenditures, 
employment, education, investment, access to credit markets, and so on.   
vii
 Other channels may also exist. For example, Hunt (2007) using Peruvian data finds that 
victims of natural disasters are more likely to be involved in a bribery episode.  
viii In their study, the instances of corruption include only those discovered by the 
Department of Justice. Thus, they may likely underestimate the actual incidences.  
ix
 A commune is the smallest administrative unit in Vietnam. Each commune includes several 
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villages, which are the traditional form of communities in Vietnam. 
x Ferraz and Finan (2011) show that the practice of political institutions may affect 
corruption level at the local level in Brazil. 
xi Source: http://gfdrr.org/ctrydrmnotes/Vietnam.pdf 
xii In an ideal natural experiment, that has a perfectly random assignment of affected 
(treatment group) and unaffected communes (control group), cross sectional data is 
sufficient for identification.  As Angrist and Pischke (2009) mention this ideal natural 
experiment setting mentioned above is very rare. 
xiii
 Haughton and Khander (2009) provide a good discussion on the measures of income and 
consumption for the case of household survey used in this study 
 
xiv The incomes used in the following analysis are total incomes from main economic 
activities, while expenditures refer to spending on consumption. The VNLSS provides 
detailed information on income and expenditure by category. Please refer to appendix 
A4 for a summary statistics.  To check robustness, we also ran the regression for 
significant categories. For example, we may consider income from agricultural 
production and expenditure on consumption and so on. Findings from alternative 
specifications are consistent with those reported here. 
xv We can simplify the model by removing the lag terms. Actually, the empirical results 
don’t find these terms to be significant.    
xvi Their disaster coping mechanisms are also insignificantly different, as demonstrated 
in the next section. 
xvii For all mechanisms, we apply the same model specification for income and expenditures 
as follows: 
 
where Rivt  represents the household’s remittances, savings, and asset plus durable goods 
holding.  
 
xviii Yet, as mentioned in section 3.2, a natural disaster generates a highly random 
assignment between affected communes and unaffected communes; thus, we do not 
observe significant differences in observable characteristics between households.   
 
xix For simplicity, we do not consider multiple migrations in which the households 
return to their original commune after having moved to another commune for a certain 
period of time. 
 
xx
 Mueller & Quisumbing (2011) also show that agricultural workers who switched 
employment to the non-agricultural sector as a coping strategy may have benefitted in terms 
of having a lower per cent reduction in wages. 
 
